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no one can fail to recognize the merit and the value of a book which is certainly the completest, as it is also the most convenient introduction to English political philosophy that exists.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Arthur Kenyan Rogers, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. viii., 360.

There can be little doubt that at the present time an introduction to philosophy is a desideratum. Anyone, therefore, who seeks to supply this need in philosophical literature should meet with a welcome not merely from teachers of philosophy or students beginning work in the subject, but from that wider public which finds philosophy more or less of an intellectual necessity.

It is the ostensible intention of Dr. Rogers in the volume before us to meet in some measure this want. Writing apparently as a teacher of philosophy and with a broad and living interest in its problems, he has, perhaps, the best equipment for such an undertaking. But it is not easy frankly to congratulate him either on his appreciation of the difficulties of his task or on the specific manner in which he has sought to carry it out. An introduction, no matter how brief, should primarily introduce. Dr. Rogers has throughout concentrated his attention mainly on criticism. A few representative problems and points of view, which have appeared in modern metaphysics (though certainly not for the first time in the history of philosophy) have been selected, and passed under a short critical review. But it is obvious that criticism deals with results, not with beginnings, leads away from what is discussed, and not up to it, as an introduction should. The author is so eager to bring forward objections and difficulties that he scarcely takes time to give a sufficient, not to say sympathetic, statement of the subject he wishes to discuss. The consequence is that he really presupposes on the part of the reader a knowledge of the ideas and principles he deals with, and even considerable insight into the meaning of the problems involved; and thus writes not so much for the philosophically uninitiated as for those who have already made some acquaintance with the subject.

To come to details. Any author is of course at liberty to

conceive and to restrict the object-matter of which he treats as he chooses. But it may be doubted whether an introduction to modern philosophy which omits all direct reference to ethical, psychological and logical questions and problems, and confines attention solely to metaphysics (p. 19, 20), is made as valuable to the student as it might be, or is entitled to be called an introduction to philosophy and to *modern* philosophy in particular. What is of importance for such a purpose is rather a comprehensive statement of all that is embraced by modern philosophy, and a precise delimitation of its various parts.

On the other hand the subjects brought forward for discussion by Dr. Rogers are sufficiently central to justify the prominence which the author assigns to them. After an introductory chapter, where he seeks to state the aim of philosophy, a chapter which is somewhat vague and confused, both in thought and statement, the author takes up as the first problem of metaphysics, the first approach to the inquiry into "the fundamental nature of reality, of the universe in which we live," the distinction and the relation between mind and matter. A very brief analysis on traditional lines of the empirical concept "thing" (which is apparently taken, with doubtful reason, as the type of what is meant by "matter"), and of the notion of self leads to the question of the nature of the relation subsisting between them. Here three views are dealt with, Dualism, Pantheism and Theism. The author criticises these modes of explanation quite generally, without distinguishing the various forms in which they have appeared. The various modes of explaining the unity of matter and mind are successively passed in review and rejected by a criticism which is far too brief to be convincing. One peculiarity of the author's method of criticism which is discoverable at intervals throughout the book, appears here in the course of his argument and may be mentioned in passing. So eager is the author to urge difficulties and objections to the views discussed, that he does not scruple in the case of one doctrine to point a criticism which assumes the truth of some principle whose worth he nevertheless deliberately questions whenever it suits the purposes of his criticism of another doctrine to do so. In the present chapter, for instance, he questions the necessity of the principle of causation at one point (p. 55), and soon thereafter (p. 57) argues with the scientist that to doubt the supremacy of causation is to imperil the whole fabric of scientific knowledge. Such a *modus disputandi* makes it diffi-

cult to determine where our author stands; it is suggestive rather of a stage duel than of a genuine combat.

After deciding that none of the above three forms of explaining the unity of matter and mind are tenable, the author passes in the next chapter to consider two other modes of uniting their apparent heterogeneity, both of which proceed by explaining away, or explaining one in terms of the other. These are Materialism and Subjective Idealism. A very inadequate reference to the relations of mechanism and teleology forms the bridge between the two chapters. The argument in this chapter is a striking instance of the author's method of criticism above noted. After pointing out that the scientist is necessarily a materialist (p. 64), and that it is the natural consequence of his view to reduce all phenomena to matter and motion, the author finally refutes materialism by showing that after all the very basis of the materialistic view is the principle of consciousness, that the materialistic construction of the world is a thought-product (p. 73-5), and that thus materialism, when it understands itself properly, should become idealism, more particularly subjective idealism (p. 76). But in the short discussion of this latter view, the main objection to it rests just on the substantial truth of the scientific (*i. e.*, materialistic) position (p. 82-3).

Materialism and Subjective Idealism having in turn both been found wanting, the author thinks that in order to come to a clearer view of the nature of reality we are compelled to leave this attempt to solve the problem by means of the ultimate facts, matter or mind, and must rather examine first of all the nature of knowledge itself. The inquiry "shifts from ontology or cosmology to epistemology" (p. 88). The problem of knowledge thus forms the subject-matter of his fourth discussion and is dealt with in the succeeding four chapters on "Rationalism and Sensationalism," "Kant," "Hegel," and "Agnosticism." It is perhaps necessary to protest in passing against the somewhat loose way in which the author regards epistemology and ontology as both answering the same question (p. 18, 19). He seems to suppose that in passing from ontology in the preceding chapters to epistemology he is still dealing with the same subject-matter. This is surely erroneous.

The position of rationalism is not clearly stated; it is even (p. 100) identified with the doctrine of innate ideas. It is treated as antithetic to the position of sensationalism, both being found

defective when taken separately. The argument follows the historical evolution of the theory of knowledge, through Kant and the idealistic and agnostic developments of his principle. It is unfortunately impossible in this JOURNAL to go into the details of the argument and criticisms contained in these chapters. But, to take isolated statements, we must point out that the existence of things in themselves, is not, as the author supposes (p. 155), identical for Kant with the external reference in knowledge. The author's statement, too, on p. 251-2 would lead one to believe that he is unacquainted with the Critique of Judgment, where precisely the same view is put forward by Kant himself which the author seeks to use to improve on Kant! Again, both in the case of Kant and of Hegel, the author is quite mistaken in limiting their positions to what is purely or primarily individualistic, subjective. It is impossible to read without some astonishment that "Hegel's philosophy is an acute and valuable psychology of the individual and of society, not a science of the universe."

All the views in these four chapters on epistemology are rejected, agnosticism included, the criticism of which is suggestive, though too short and wandering in statement to be effective. After this consistently negative attitude to all the positions hitherto brought forward, we look with some expectancy for the author's own positive views. These we are left to gather from the last two chapters, entitled "Theistic Idealism" and "Scepticism and the Criterion of Truth." There is no essential connection between the contents of these chapters; the former gives in the barest outline a general metaphysical point of view; the latter the conditions under which a philosophical theory can be accepted as valid.

The author holds that "in idealism of some sort is alone to be found a solution whose failure is not a foregone conclusion." The essential character of idealism is that ultimate reality is conceived "after the analogy of conscious life" (p. 269). For knowledge itself, it is necessary that the sensational (objective) element in experience should have the power to stand for something "similar to" active conscious life (p. 271); ultimate existence to be known must be "of a nature resembling in some degree our own conscious life." Hence objects are looked at as elements in absolute consciousness, in God's life, are foci of God's purposes, whose nature is to be determined by the part they play in the

"intelligent purposive life which makes up the absolute." Conscious beings, because essentially active (p. 290-1), have their reality in the function they fulfill in the life of the Absolute, and in virtue of that function (which is seen clearest in social life) they can be at once dependent on the absolute and yet distinct from it. The author has not elaborated this view in detail, which makes it hardly fair or possible to criticise it. It is his own position in a book which is a guide to modern philosophy in general. By so doing he merely brings forward another theory (if theory it can be called), to which as many objections could be raised as to those he has attacked. This, indeed, the author practically admits when in the next chapter he declares that "no philosophical theory is . . . fitted to carry conviction to every mind;" and such vague terms as "life," "resemblance" or "analogy" between our conscious life and that of ultimate reality, make it sufficiently difficult for his own view to carry conviction.

The last chapter is a rather tangled piece of argument, from which it is hardly possible to obtain a definite result of much value. It is nominally an attempt to determine the criterion or criteria of truth by means of which we may avoid scepticism. The test is taken at one point to be "consonancy with experience as a concrete whole" (p. 320). "Experience as a whole" is at one time equivalent to all the facts we know (p. 322), at another to the "concrete whole of reality," which is "only taken as it stands" (p. 323). At one time he says that "if reality were a purely intellectual affair" consistency would be quite sufficient to test the truth of a theory (p. 323); at another (328 ff.) we find it is only for "practical purposes" that the test of consistency can hold, theoretically we cannot rest satisfied with it. Setting aside the difficulty of applying the test of "experience as a whole," which probably means the same to the author as the ideal of knowledge, we are furnished later on with another test of truth. This is practical "experiment." Which is to be the ultimate test is "only a matter of our point of view." Experiment theoretically "implies the test of consistency," "consistency is the ultimate criterion" (p. 331); but later on (p. 333 ff.) he proceeds to show that "experiment may be said to be more ultimate than intellectual consistency." We may note in passing that the author is obviously wrong in describing experiment as a test of truth at all; it is a means of attaining knowledge, not a formal characteristic of the ideal of knowledge.

Again, to test the truth of a philosophical theory we must "apply it to life" (p. 338 ff.). The purpose of thought is practice; a philosophical theory is a hypothesis for life to act on. Hence action is the test of a theory of life and not consistency. But "action" is not "experiment" (p. 360); the test of a practical hypothesis by action and an intellectual hypothesis by experiment are altogether different (*ibid.*). Yet later on (p. 365-6), we cannot make any real separation between them, though the "distinction" remains. Again, the intellectual is said (p. 363) to presuppose the moral; but on p. 366 we find that intellectual knowledge is the absolute presupposition of moral action. Such contradictory statements make it quite impossible to derive from his argument a positive conclusion. All truth, we are finally told (p. 349), is at best "a more or less probable hypothesis," and it is suggested that we should "give up an ideal of certainty," for "might not a life of certainty be a rather stupid life?" The ultimate test of a philosophical theory is simply the "progressive experience of living;" "we find out the meaning of life by living, not by merely reasoning about it" (p. 352-3). Would the author find out the meaning of sleep by sleeping, or of digestion by taking food? Does it not strike him that to take up a position like this is to commit his library to the flames? It is doubtless true, as Fichte says, that philosophy is not life, but it is no less true that life is not philosophy.

The last chapter particularly, and parts of the book as a whole, seem to have been hurriedly written, and indefiniteness and vagueness of expression have taken the place of pointed statement. This has seriously affected the author's exposition of views which are in many ways freshly conceived and could easily have been made more effective and convincing.

J. B. BAILLIE.

ST. ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY.

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF MORALITY. By G. Gore, LL. D. F. R. S. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1899. Pp. vi., 576.

The object of this lengthy book is "to place the subject of human conduct upon a comprehensive scientific basis and supply a rational want—to show that the entire conduct of man, physical, mental and moral, is based upon a scientific foundation; to make clear the truth that the great powers and laws of science are the